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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The

Petitioner,

Weber

Memorial

Care

Center,

Inc.,

(hereinafter "Weber Memorial"), was a provider of long-term health
care in Ogden, Utah.

Chartham Management, Inc. was the management

corporation which operates the Weber Memorial Care Center.

A

number of the patients of Weber Memorial qualified for Medicaid
assistance, and

under

the

state-administered

Medicaid

system,

Weber Memorial was reimbursed by the Stae Department of Health,
Division

of

Health

Appellee

herein.

Care
After

Financing, which

was

some

of

four

years

the

Defendant

litigation

the

Petitioner still has not had its opportunity to put on evidence
which would

tend

to

show

the

Utah Medicaid

Plan

is not

in

compliance with federal law.
In 1981 the State of Utah adopted a "flat-rate" system
for reimbursing

providers.

Under

this system, all long-term

health care providers are paid a single rate per patient, per day
for "intermediate" and "skilled" patients.

Regardless of costs,

the provider is reimbursed according to the flat rate set by the
Department.

If costs, no matter how unavoidable, exceed the flat

rate, the provider must operate at a deficit.
42

U.S.C.

§

1396(a)(13(A),

the

so-called

"Boren

Amendment," instructs states participating in the Medicaid program
to pay health care providers through the use of rates which are
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"reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred
by

efficiently

and

economically

operated

facilities."

These

facilities operate in a heavily regulated environment, and, as the
Boren Amendment also directs, the rates must take into account the
costs

associated

with

compliance

with

"applicable

state

and

federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards . • .
insur[ing] that individuals eligible for assistance have reasonable

access

(taking

into

account

reasonable travel time), • • ."

geographical

Id.

location

and

See, also, Hillhaven Corp.

v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health, 634 F.Supp. 1313, 1315 (E.D. Wis.
1986).
Weber Memorial was purchased from Weber County in 1981.
When that purchase occurred, the facility became a privately-held
asset.

With private ownership came burdens not associated with

public ownership by Weber County.
paid

and

additions

Property taxes now had to be

to the physicial plant

system had to be made.

such as a sprinkler

In spite of these additional costs, good

management brought the overall cost down, accomplished by responsible reductions in staff, centralization of support functions and
economies
costs,

in purchasing.

including

with Medicaid

Despite

staff reductions

significant

efforts

etc., the costs

of

to reduce
complying

standards of patient care and safety exceeded the

flat rate.
At

all

times, Weber Memorial
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contended,

as

it

still

does, that it was and is an efficiently and economically operated
facility.
rule

Therefore, Weber Memorial requested a hearing under the

promulgated

by

the

Department,

in

order

to

contest

the

operation of the Utah Medicaid System.
Weber Memorial made its request for hearing on July 28,
1983.

The administrative hearing finally commenced on August 3,

1984, over a year after it was originally requested. Pursuant to a
hearing officer's ruling, Weber Memorial was never permitted

to

introduce evidence of its costs or to prove, as it was prepared
to, that it is an efficiently and economically operated facility
within the meaning of the federal statute.
On May 20, 1985, nearly two years after the request for
hearing was

submitted,

the hearing

officer

issued

Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law.
Director adopted
appealed

the findings

the decision

to

the

on June 4, 1985.
District

his

Proposed

The Executive
Weber Memorial

Court, which

issued

its

opinion affirming the hearing officer on June 3, 1986 (Memorandum
Opinion, J. Fishier), followed by a Final Judgment entered August
4, 1986 by Judge Daniels.

Thereafter, an appeal was filed.

This

Petition is brought following the decision of the Court of Appeals
which erroneously upheld the decision of the District Court.
petition

raises

important

federal/state

answered by this Court.
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issues

never

This
before

ARGUMENT
I
THE UTAH STATE MEDICAID PLAN FAILS TO COMPLY
WITH FEDERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE INVALID

The

Appellant,

Weber

Memorial

Care

Center,

was

a

provider of Medicaid services within the State of Utah and, as
such, is subject to both state and federal regulations due to its
participation in the Medicaid program, and has done its best to
comply with all relevant rules and regulations at both the state
and

federal

levels

since

the

commencement

of

its

operation.

During this appellate process the facility has been sold but the
property right remains.
Weber Memorial accepted patients who qualify for medical
assistance under the Utah State Plan which was filed pursuant to
Title XIX of the Social Security Act with the Secretary of Health
and Human Services.

The Department of Health of the State of Utah

refused to pay a fair and legally required rate of reimbursement
to Weber Memorial for care rendered to the said patients.
already pointed out, the federal statute

As

underlying the federal

Medicaid regulations is found at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A). The
statute, as well as the federal regulations, are set forth in the
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Appendix

in

full

(Appendix-1).

The

regulations,

of

course,

reiterate the requirement set forth in the statute that rates must
be

"reasonable

incurred

by

and

adequate

efficiently

and

to

meet

the

economically

costs

that

operated

must

be

providers

to

provide services in conformity with applicable State and Federal
laws, regulations and quality and safety
added.)

42 C.F.R. § 447.253(b)(1).

standards."

(Emphasis

The State is required to make

"findings" that "the rates used to reimburse providers satisfy the
requirements of the regulations."
"findings" are completed,

the

Id. at 447.253(b).

State must

"assurances" to the federal government

After these

then make

and

submit

that the requirements of

the statute, as well as "all other parts of [the regulations]" are
being met.

Ix[. at 447.253(a).

formulated
above,

pursuant

must

to

incorporate

statute and regulations.
In

the

this

The State's Plan, which must be

statute

the

and

affirmative

regulations

mentioned

requirements

of

the

as

the

42 C.F.R. § 447.252.

case,

the

hearing

officer,

as

well

District Court and Court of Appeals apparently glossed over the
requirement of "findings" and "assurances" in connection with a
state plan.

Apparently, because the State did submit assurances

which were accepted by the federal government, the hearing officer
failed to look beyond the surface at those assurances in order to
determine

whether

or

not

they

were

supported

findings" and therefore had a basis in fact.
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by

"substantive

The

regulations

implementing

the

federal

Medicaid

statutes require that the state medicaid agency must find that the
rates to reimburse providers satisfy

the requirements of law,

i.e., that the rates "are reasonable and adequate to meet the
costs

that must

be

incurred

operated facilities."

by

efficiently

42 C.F.R. § 447.250(a).

and

economically

As the record in

this matter is reviewed, it becomes clear that the Department of
Health of the State of Utah has not made findings sufficient to
provide assurances to the Department of Health and Human Services,
(hereinafter "HHS"), of compliance with federal law.

In fact, no

findings at all have been made by the Secretary or the State of
Utah

relative

to

what

methodology

will

meet

the

federal

requirements. As the deposition of Vaughn Emmett, Director of the
Bureau of Program Review, Department of Health, State of Utah,
indicates, there have been no studies conducted by the Department
of Health

that

have

examined

any

provider

in

the

state

to

determine whether such providers are efficiently and economically
operated.

All of this was neatly ignored by the hearing officer

and lower courts.
In Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Tex, 1983)
the District Court granted the provider's motion for a preliminary
injunction, in part, for the reason that the state rate setters
failed to examine actual costs and provider efficiencies.
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From all that appears to this Court . . . [the
state] never sought to ascertain, and thus never
knew, even the approximate extent of provision of
unnecesary services or of provider inefficiency.
No attempt was made to go outside of provider
cost reports in an effort to determine the extent
or nature of unnecessary services; admittedly,
the state] undertook no independent study of any
acility's
provision of services, or its economy
*
and efficiency, nor did it attempt to determine
in any manner what the cost of a required service
should be.
(Emphasis added).
the rate-setters

_Id_. at 906.
failed

Similarly, the Court found that

to "ascertain whether

the same level of care indeed had a similar

facilities within
"mix" of residents

before choosing to rely upon the Department of Health's certification as its primary basis for determining adequacy of reimbursement rates.11
likewise

I_d_.

In the context of this case, the records will

reflect

the

Department's

failure

to

conduct

any

"independent study of any facility's provision of services, or its
economy and efficiency", nor did
services

at

Weber

Memorial

or

it examine the "costs" of any
any

other

particular

facility.

Additionally, as discussed in Section III below, the special "mix"
of

residents

at

matter, was
As

in no way

the Court

adopting

Weber

in Thomas

the

Memorial,
considered

or
in

v. Johnston

"reimbursement

rate

other

facilities

the

rate-setting

found,

such

structure

capricious, and in violation of federal law."
Other cases are similar:
Association

v.

Dunning,

778

F.2d
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for

that

process.

a "manner" of
was

arbitrary,

Id. at 904.

e.g.

In Nebraska Health Care

1291

(8th

Cir.

1985)

cert.

denied,
Wisconsin

U.S.
Dept.

, 107 S.Ct. 947 (1987); Hillhaven Corp. v.
of

Health,

634

F.Supp.

1313,

1319

(E.D. Wis.

1986).
Federal law also requires that methods and standards be
developed by the State in devising
C.R.F. § 447.252(b).

a remibursement

system.

42

However, in this case, there was no testing,

nor were any standards or methods established by Utah regarding
the efficiency or economy of services provided.

Instead, based

upon conversations with some heatlh care providers, legislators,
and otherw sith an interest in the matter, the State established a
budget-oriented, flat-rate reimbursement system.
a substantive

finding by the State of Utah

that

There was never
"the rates

to

reimburse the providers satisfy the requirement" of the regulations or 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(13)(A).
As the Court in Thomas v. Johnston, supra, pointed out:
The statute clearly and expressly leaves room for
states to cut unnecessary costs in a wide variety
of ways.
On the other hand, however, it manifestly imposes a substantive limitation on state
governmental action -- that rates determined by
Medicaid agencies must be high enough to compensate
efficiently
and
economically
operated
providers for costs necessarily
incurred
in
providing the type of care for their residents
that conforms to all applicable state and federal
laws and requirements . . . . As stated above,
under this standard, state Medicaid agencies are
free to deny providers compensation for provisions of unnecessary services.
Likewise, the
states are not required to pay all costs incurred
by providers that are not operating efficiently
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and economically.
Thus, states not only have a
great deal of flexibility
in selecting the
methods by which rates will be determined, but
are also accorded freedom to decide what costs
are necessary or unnecessary, and to determine
whether
and
which
providers
are
operating
efficiently and economically.
In addition the
development of the Medicaid Act and the evolution
of the reimbursement system away from Medicare
principles or reimbusement make it clear that
states are not required to make their decisions
concerning
'efficiency
and
economy'
and
'adequacy1 with the greatest degree of precision.
Nevertheless, the bottom line of the federal
statutory standard, the substantive limit placed
by Congress upon the state, is that rates must be
sufficient to compensate efficiently and economically operated providers for the necessary
costs they incur in providing required care to
their residents.
(Emphasis added).
Utah,

through

Id_. at 909.

its

Department

It is submitted that the State of
of

Health,

clearly

exceeded

the

"substantive limitation" imposed by the federal statute.
The hearing officer steadfastly refused to consider the
very

indicia

limitations"

of

the

State's

already

compliance

pointed

out,

with

i.e.,

the
the

"substantive
costs,

the

"efficiencies" and "economies" of Weber Memorial Care Center.
In
"assurances"
examination
required.

order
to
of

for

the

the

state

federal

actual

agency

to

have

government,

it

is

providers

and

actual

made

proper

apparent

that

facilities

was

As already mentioned, that did not occur.

It is clear

that the assurances made were but bald assertions based on the
language

of

the

regulations,

but
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without

substance

in

fact.

Therefore, until the state plan meets those requirements, it is
defective and should be declared invalid.

See, e.g., Nebraska

Health Care Association v. Dunning, supra; Hillhaven Corp. v,
Wisconsin Dept.

of Health, supra.

This Court should recognize

the refusal of the judicial system of the this state to date, to
bring these facts to light and to recognize them as such.
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently found, a
provider plaintiff does have a right to have its claim heard on
the merits, and to receive a judicial determination as to whether
"the actions

and non-action

of

the State

. . . violate the

standard set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A)."

Coos Bay Care

Center v. State of Oregon, Department of Human Resources, 803 F.2d
1060, 1063, (9th Cir. 1986).

That is all that is sought here.

II
EVEN IF THE UTAH STATE PLAN IS NOT INVALID PER SE,
THE HEARING OFFICER'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW WEBER MEMORIAL
THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF ITS COSTS
AND TO PROVE IT IS AN EFFICIENTLY AND ECONOMICALLY
OPERATED FACILITY WAS CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE
FEDERAL STATUTE AND REGULATIONS AND IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING
Keeping in mind the thrust of the Boren Amendment, that
efficiently and economically operated facilities are to have their
costs met, Weber Memorial, feeling that it qualified under that
standard and yet was not having its costs met, sought a hearing
before a hearing officer appointed by the Utah State Department of

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI - 10

Health.

As already

described

earlier, when Weber Memorial was

finally able to receive its hearing, it was totally precluded from
producing evidence which would have demonstrated that it met the
very objective of the statute.
As one court recently explained:
Although 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) was amended October
1, 1980, the change, known as the Boren Amendment,
expressly reflects an emphasis in reimbursement
to that which is reasonable and adequate to meet
a cost incurred by a facility in order to conform
to applicable state and federal laws and regulations. Therefore, . . . the new Boren Amendment
requires full and current reimbursement of actual
expenditures incurred by facilities. As well, it
prohibits any device utilized by a state to lower
reimbursement, other than that authorized by
statute.
(Emphasis

added).

Geriatrics,

Social Services, 712 P.2d

Inc. v.

Colorado

Department

1035, 1039, (Colo. App. 1985).

of

Thus,

the Court recognized that the intent of the law is to reimburse
facilities

for

"actual

expenditures

incurred"

as

long as those

expenditures are made in order to conform to applicable law, and
assuming

the facility

is efficiently

and economically

operated.

Indeed, the law requires that "the rate in fact must be reasonable
and adequate within the meaning of the statute."

Hillcrest Corp.

v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health, supra. 634 F.Supp. at 1318, citing
42 C.F.R. § 447.252(a)
ruling
itself.

of

the

hearing

Several

(1982).
officer

months

prior

In this
referred
to
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case, the preliminary
to

earlier

the hearing,

he

speaks

for

effectively

closed the door to the evidence most crucial to Weber Memorial's
case.

Indeed, the transcript of the hearing is replete with

examples of how the hearing officer's ruling effectively denied
Weber Memorial an opportunity for a fair hearing.

See, Excerpts

from Transcript of Formal Hearing, Hearing held August 3, 1984,
before

Brian

L.

Farr,

Administrative

Law

Judge,

Addendum.

Plaintiff was effectively denied an opportunity to prove that the
rate "in fact" was not "reasonable and adequate" to meet its costs
"within the meaning of the statute."
It is a fundamental principle of due process that a
party appearing before an administrative body is entitled to a
fair hearing, including the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
officer's

The effect of the hearing

ruling, as well as the District

Court's

affirmance

thereof, is to deny Weber Memorial a meaningful and fair hearing
on the central issue of the entire statutory scheme.
Thus,
authority

under

while
his

the

hearing

fact-finding

officer
powers

certainly
to

find

had

that

the

Weber

Memorial was not jln^ fact an efficiently and economically operated
facility, or that it was jLn_ fact having its costs met, etc., he
refused to even take any evidence on those issues.

In essence,

Weber Memorial has never had its day in court.
A participant provider in the Medicaid system no doubt
has a property interest in achieving or enforcing its rights under
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that system.

See, e.g., Bowens v. North Carolina Department of

Human Resources, 710 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir. 1983).

The question in

this case, insofar as the Constitution is concerned, is what type
of hearing is required.

The particular type of hearing "must be

tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to
be heard."

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
In this case, the only way Weber Memorial can be heard

in a meaningful manner is to permit it to demonstrate its costs
and

to

submit

evidence

concerning

the

efficiencies.

Weber

Memorials's witnesses would, of course, be fully subject to cross
examination.

It

is only by permitting

this kind

of evidence,

focused upon the individual provider, that the circuitous logic of
the State,
economically

(that

the rate

operated

and

is the definition of efficiently and
that

the

only

way

to

be

considered

efficiently and economically operated is to have costs below the
flat rate), can be broken.
Petitioners seek a remand to the hearing officer for a
true

evidentiary

hearing

in

which

the

Petitioners,

given

the

guidelines which the Court will hopefully provide concerning the
requirements of federal law, will receive the opportunity to prove
that Weber Memorial is an efficiently

and economically

operated

facility and yet is not having its costs met under the Utah State
Medicaid Plan.
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Ill
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED
A DEFERENTIAL STANDARD TO THE AGENCY'S
CONCLUSION OF LAW

There

is one final point to be made concerning the

standard of review in this case.

In reviewing the Memorandum

Decision of Judge Fishier (Addendum-18) and the Final Judgment by
Judge Daniels (Addendum-19), it is evident tha the District Coutt
applied a deferential standard
Director's

decision

with

its

to the review of the Executive
incorporation

Officer's findings and recommendations.

of

the

Hearing

Apparently, the District

Court felt constrained by UCA § 26-23-1(3) to rule in favor of the
State if the Executive Director's "final determination was supported by a residuum of legally admissible evidence in the record
and was not arbitrary and capricious."

As pointed out at length

already, Petitioners submit that the record does not support the
prior determination even as adjudged by the deferential standard.
However, the District Court's ruling is fundamentally flawed for
another reason.

An Appellate Court is never required to defer to

an agency ruling on questions
admissibility of evidence.

of

law and

on rulings

on the

The cryptic decision of the District

Judges below, on their face, reflect a failure to recognize the
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appropriate standard of review on these questions.

Furthermore,

this Court certainly has the inherent authority to review and
correct erroneous rulings of law without any deference to either
the agency's findings and conclusions or the District Court's
erroneous determination•
As stated in Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department of
Employment, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah, 1982):
In administrative cases, our scope of review of
an agency's decision as to legal questions and
questions of mixed law and fact is generally
broader than our scope of review of questions of
fact. On most questions of statutory construction, with some exceptions, our review is plenary
with no deference accorded the administrative
determination.
(Emphasis added).

See, also, Madison v. Alaska Department of Fish

and Game, 696 P.1d 168 (Alaska 1985) (issues of statutory interpretation

and

whether

administrative

board

acted

within

its

statutory authority "fall into the realm of special competency of
the courts;" statutory interpretation of the words "customary and
raditional" at issue); Gardiner v. Arizona Department of Economic
Security, 623 P.2d 33, 36 (Ariz. App. 1980) ("court may substitute
its judgment for the agency's

conclusions regarding

the legal

effect of [the] facts"); International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local

1357 v. Hawaiian Telephone Co., 713 P.2d

943

(Hawaii 1986) (agency's legal conclusions are freely reviewable by
the courts); Dangerfield v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., 694 P.2d
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439 (Kan. 1985) (questions of law are always open to review by
courts); Conwell v. City of Albuquerque, 637 P.2d 567, 569 (N.M.
1981) (Court "may correct the [administrative] decision-maker's
misapplication of the law"); Clarke v. Shoreline School District
No. 412, King County, 720 P.2d 793 (Wash. 1986) (reviewing court
reviews the issues of law de novo).
In this case, then, because a resolution of this case
requires an interpretation of the "Boren Amendment", 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(13)(A) and the implementing federal regulations, the
District Court erred in applying a deferential standard.

This

Court may then interpret the statute <de_ novo in arriving at its
decision.

Additionally,

since

the

introduction

of the evidence regarding

refusal

to

Petitioner's

permit

the

costs and

efficiencies, as discussed previously, was clerarly prejudicial to
Petitioners' case, as appears on the record, Downey State Bank v.
Major-Blakeney Corporation, 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah) 1978), and was
contrary to the underlying purpose and intent of the governing
statute, this Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Weber Memorial respectfully
requests that the Court declare the State of Utah Medicaid Plan,
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and

particularly

the

"flat

rate"

aspect

thereof,

invalid.

Alternatively, Petitioners simply seek the opportunity to submit
evidence

before

Memorial

is

an

a

hearing

efficiently

officer
and

demonstrating

economically

that

operated

Weber

facility

within the meaning of the federal law, but that it is not having
its costs met within the flat rate.
The decision

of the Court

of Appeals

was

really

not

responsive to the points raised here and, with all due respect,
seemed to ignore the principal issues.

The Court of Appeals took

a benign view of the system, stating, in effect, that if the Utah
plan met most of the providers' needs, then Weber Memorial, not
the State, must be out of line.

That facile conclusion is exactly

what the Petitioners wish to refute by the production of evidence.
Common sense would indicate that the earth is flat; evidence would
allow that notion to be dispelled.

Please let this provider have

its day in court.
DATED this /S^7

day of April, 1988.
WINDER & HASLAM

LOJEK & HALL, CTD.

Donald W. Loj ek
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TN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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OPINION
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Case No. 860342-CA
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Before Judges Bench, Garff and Davidson.

BENCH, Judge:

C&eritoittieCcvrt

I**** Com ct *wxm

Plaintiffs appeal from the final judgment of a trial court
affirming the final determination of the executive director of
the Utah Department of Health (Department). We affirm.
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(1983), commonly referred to as the Medicaid Act, establishes d
cooperative relationship in which the federal and state
governments share the costs of medical services to the needy, If
a state elects to participate, it must establish a state plan
which complies with statutory and regulatory requirements under
the Medicaid Act. Prior to 1980, states participating in the
Medicaid program were required to reimburse health care providers
for their "reasonable costs." Typically, a provider would submit
an accounting of its costs to the Department. The Department
would then review these costs on a case by case, charge by charge
basis and reimburse those costs deemed reasonable. In 1980,
Congress amended the Medicaid Act to allow a flat rate system of
reimbursement. Subsection 1396(a)(13)(A), commonly referred to
as the Boren Amendment, now provides:
A State plan for medical assistance must
provide for payment . . . of the hospital,
skilled nursing facility, and intermediate
care facility services provided under the
plan through the use of rates (determined
in accordance with methods and standards
developed by the State
1 which the

State finds, and makes assurances
satisfactory to the Secretary, are
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
which must be incurred by efficiently and
economically operated facilities in order
to provide care and services in conformity
with applicable State and Federal laws,
regulations, and quality and safety
standards . . • .
Defendant Department is the state agency responsible for
administering the Medicaid program in Utah, In 1981, in
response to the Boren Amendment and the urging of the Utah
Health Care Association, the state legislature directed the
Department to organize a committee to develop and propose a
flat rate plan for reimbursement under the Medicaid program.
Under the plan proposed by the committee, patients who qualify
for Medicaid assistance are classified according to the degree
of care needed. The health care provider is then paid a
statewide flat rate fee per patient per day according to the
classification of such patient. The flat rate is modified by a
"property differential," unique to each provider, to account
for wide variations in property costs. The flat rate is also
adjusted annually to account for inflation and other factors.
The proposed plan was submitted through the statutory
rulemaking process. A public hearing was held, and no
objection was voiced from the health care industry. The plan
was then submitted to the United States Department of Health
and Human Services which certified that the plan satisfied all
requirements of the law and that all assurances submitted under
the requirements of the Medicaid Act were acceptable. The
modified flat rate plan became effective July 1, 1981.
Plaintiff Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc. (Weber Memorial)
is a long-term health care provider. In September 1981, Weber
Memorial acquired the subject facility from Weber County.
Plaintiff Chartham Management, Inc. manages the facility
pursuant to a contract with Weber Memorial. In 1983, Weber
Memorial requested a hearing before the Department to challenge
the application of the modified flat rate plan and the
classification of patients. Prior to the hearing, the
Department filed a motion asking the hearing officer to rule,
as a matter of law, that the state plan did not violate federal
law and that the plan did not require an examination of Weber
Memorial's costs nor a determination whether this particular
facility is efficiently and economically operated. The hearing
officer granted the Department's motion. Consequently, at the
administrative hearing which commenced August 3, 1984, Weber
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Memorial was not permitted to introduce evidence of its costs
nor attempt to prove it is efficiently and economically
operated.
In his proposed findings, conclusions, and decision, the
hearing officer concluded the modified flat rate plan complied
with all provisions of federal and state law, and the
Department did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary
to law in the development, implementation, and operation of the
plan. The executive director of the Department adopted the
hearing officer's findings in her final determination dated
June 4, 1985. Weber Memorial filed a petition for review in
the Third District Court.1 In a memorandum decision and
final judgment, the trial court affirmed, finding "the
Executive Director's final determination was supported fay H
residuum of legally admissible evidence in the record and was
not arbitrary or capricious." Weber Memorial appeals from the
trial court's final judgment.
When a trial court reviews an administrative decision and
the court's judgment is challenged on appeal, this Court
reviews the administrative decision as if the appeal had come
directly from the agency. Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah
Securities Division, 744 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1987). Therefore,
it is not necessary to address Weber Memorial's contention that
the trial court applied the wrong standard of review. When
reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of general
questions of law, including acts of Congress, "this Court
applies a correction-of-error standard, with no deference to
the expertise of the [agency]." Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 60R (Utah 1981).
On appeal, Weber Memorial first argues that contrary to the
executive director's final determination, the modified flat
rate plan does not comply with federal law and regulations.
Section 1396(a)(13)(A) requires the state to find that the
rates, which are to be determined by methods and standards
developed by the state, reasonably and adequately meet the
1. Under the new Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-46b-l through -21 (1987) (effective January 1, 1988), the
district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo
all final agency action resulting from informal adjudicative
proceedings, while the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, as
designated by statute, has jurisdiction to review all final
agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
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costs of efficiently and economically operated facilities. The
state must also make satisfactory assurances to the federal
Department of Health and Human Services. Weber Memorial
contends the Department failed to make the necessary findings
and assurances that the rates satisfy the statutory
requirements. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.253 (1985); Marv Washington
Hospital, Inc. v. Fisher, 635 F.Supjp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1985)
(federal law does not require written findings).
The committee organized by the Department consisted of a
representative from the legislature, a legislative analyst, the
president and executive director of the Utah Health Care
Association, and a nursing home operator. Prior to selecting
the modified flat rate plan, the committee considered several
alternative methods of reimbursement. The committee based its
rate determinations on 1) the most recent information on the
actual costs being incurred by the nursing home industry in the
aggregate, as reported by each facility on its 1980 "facility
cost profile"; 2) a comparison with the rates paid by other
states in the region; 3) input from the Utah Health Care
Association; 4) a trending factor on the historical costs as
recommended by a consulting firm retained by the state; 5) a
comparison with 1976 rates, as adjusted for inflation; 6) the
legislative budget allocation;2 and 7) discussions and
interactions between committee members. Pursuant to statute,
the Department submitted to the Secretary of the federal
Department of Health and Human Services its assurances that the
rate reasonably and adequately meets the costs of efficiently
and economically operated facilities. The Secretary certified
the assurances as satisfactory.
A reasonable basis existed for the Department to find the
proposed rates were reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
of an efficiently and economically operated facility.
Ninety-three percent of all long-term health care facilities in
Utah were shown to be meeting their costs under the modified
flat rate plan, with a majority showing a profit. We conclude
the Department developed reasonable methods and standards to
determine the rates. The modified flat rate plan therefore
complies with federal law.
2. Weber Memorial claims the rates were based to an
impermissible extent on the budget factor. The budget
allocation was clearly only one of several factors considered
by the committee.
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Weber Memorial next argues that, even if the modified flat
rate plan is valid, the hearing officer erred in refusing to
allow Weber Memorial to submit evidence of its costs and proof
of its efficient and economic operation. Prior to the hearing,
the Department filed a motion to exclude as irrelevant all
evidence of Weber Memorial's costs and operation. The hearing
officer granted the motion. Weber Memorial claims the hearing
officer's ruling was contrary to l»w and a denial of its right
to a fair hearing.
Utah r\Mi^ Anu.

Jj 26-23-2(1) (1987) states:

In any such hearing, the hearing officer
shall have authority to administer oaths,
examine witnesses, and issue in the name
of the department notice of the hearings
or subpoenas requiring the testimony of
witnesses and the production of evidence
relevant to any matter in the hearing.

Utah Admin. Code R455-14 M M n X i W O

(Da'-1') a l s o provides:

The rules of evidence as applied in civil
actions in the courts of this State shall
be generally followed in the hearings.
Any relevant evidence may be admitted if
it is the type of evidence commonly relied
upon by prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs- . . . Irrelevant,
immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence
shall be excluded.
In his proposed findings, the hearing officer explained his
ruling:
The State Plan does not contain a specific
definition of what it means to be
"efficiently and economically operated."
Rather, the State has set rates for
payment for services that the State deems
are reasonable and adequate and maintains
that an "efficiently and economically
operated facility" is one that is able to
operate at or below that standard. Such
approach is proper under current law.
In explanations accompanying
regulations of the Department of Health
and Human Services, the Department
states:
860342-CA
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We have also decided not to mandate
that the State plan specifically
provide a definition of an
"efficiently and economically
operated facility." The reason for
this is that the State's methods and
standards implicitly act as the
State's definition of an efficiently
and economically operated facility,
and no explicit definition is
necessary.
Because the "Modified Flat Rate" is
applied uniformly statewide, and is the
standard by which all nursing homes are
measured, it was not necessary to examine
the specific costs of Weber Memorial Care
Center, Inc. to determine if it could be
more efficiently and economically operated
and that was not done.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(3) (1987) states, "If the final
determination of the executive director is consistent with the
findings of fact and conclusions of law recommended by the
hearing officer, the court shall review the record and may
alter the final determination only upon a finding that the
final determination is capricious, or not supported by the
evidence." The executive director, in sustaining the hearing
officer, found that since the modified flat rate implicitly
defines an efficiently and economically operated facility,
evidence of Weber Memorial's costs and operation was irrelevant
and, therefore, inadmissible. We conclude the executive
director's final determination on this issue was not
capricious, but supported by the evidence.
Weber Memorial last argues the classification of patients
under the modified flat rate plan is capricious. Under the
plan, a health care provider routinely submits recommendations
for patient classifications to the Department. Department
officials consider these recommendations and other information
supplied by the providers in making final classifications.
Weber Memorial contends the Department arbitrarily classified
thirty-eight of its patients as "intermediate" rather than
"skilled care." Skilled care patients, by definition, require
more specialized care and receive a higher rate of
reimbursement.
Requests for reconsideration of patient classifications are
routinely granted by the Department, but Weber Memorial
presented no evidence that such requests were made for the
860342-CA
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thirty-eight patients. Weber Memorial also failed to present
any evidence that the thirty-eight patients qualified as
skilled care patients, The only evidence Weber Memorial
presented in support of its claim is that the national
percentage of skilled care patients is higher than Utah's,
Such evidence is insufficient to convince this Court that the
state classification system is capricious. Section 26-23-2(3).
In conclusion, the modified flat rate plan for Medicaid
reimbursement is in full compliance with federal and state
law. The final determination of the executive director was not
capricious, but amply supported by the evidence. The final
judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. No costs
awarded.

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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tH. 1 MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

h 1396a,

4 ? § 1396a

State plans lor medical assistame.
(a) Contents

A State plan tor medical assistance must—

42 § 1396a

PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

any such care and services furnished any individual for which payment
would otherwise be made to the State with respect to him under section
1396b of this title;
(12) provide that, in determining whether an individual is blind.
there shall be an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of
the eye or by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select;
(13) provide—
(A) for payment (except uhcrc the State agenc> is subject to an
order under section 1396m of this title) of the hospital, skilled
nursing facility, and tntermec ate care facility services provided
under the plan through the use of rates (determined in accordance
with methods and standards developed by the State and which, in
the case of hospitals, take into account the situation of hospitals
which serve a disproportionate number of low income patients
with special needs and provide, in the case of hospital patients receiving services at an inappropriate level of care (under conditions
similar to those described in section 1395x(v)(lXG) of this title),
for lower reimbursement rates reflecting the level of care actual!)
received (in a manner consistent with section 1395x(v)(l)(G) of
this title) which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory
to the Secreiar). are reasonable and adequau to meet the cosn
which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
facilities in order to provide care and services in conformit} with
applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and
safety standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical
assistance have reasonable access (taking into account geographic
location and reasonable travel time) to inpatient hospital services
of adequate quality: and such State makes further assurances, satisfactory to the Secretary, for the filing of uniform cost reports b\
each hospital, skilled nursing facility, and intermediate care facilit)
and periodic audits by the State of such report and

(IS)
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intermediate care facility services provided wider the plan through the use
of rates (determined in accordance wi'h methods and standards developed
by the Slate and which, in the ease of hospitals, take iato e-count the
situation of hospitals which serve a disjiropoflionat* number of low income
patienU with special oeeds and provide, in the ca»c of hospital patients
receiving services at an inappropriate levei of care (under conditions similar
to those described in section 1895x(vKlKG) of this title), for lower reimbursement rates reflecting the level of care actually received (in a manner
consistent with section 1395x(vXlKG) of this title) which the State finds, and
makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary', are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity
with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety
standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have
reasonable access (taking into account geographic location and reasonable
travel time) to inpatient hospital service* of adequate quality; and such
State makes further assurances, satisfactory to the Secretary, for the f»l:nr
of uniform cost reports by each ho?;>iu.\ skilled nursing facility, and
intermediate cart facility and periodic aub.ts b> tne Suu- of r-uch rtpons;

Haalth Core Pinoncing Administration, NHS

42 CHt Ch. IV (10-145 Mrfiofi)
140 F* SS680. Dec. 3. 1981:47 FR S567, Mar.
2.1982.
19831 as amended at 4S FR 6*057. Dec 19.

I447.XS2 State plan requirements.

(a) The plan must provide that the
requirements of this subpart are met.
<b) The plan must specify comprehensively the methods and standards
used by the aaency to set payment
rates In a manner consistent with 45
CFR 301.2.
(c) If the aaency chooses to apply
the cost limits established under Medicare Csee f 405.460 of this chapter) on
an individual provider basis, the plan
must specify this requirement.
(Approved by the Office of Management
and Budget under control number 09389193)
I4S FR 9S0SS. Dec. 19.1983)

Subpart C—Payment for Inpatient
Hatpitof and Ung-Term Cart Facility Services
SOUSCX: 46 FR 47971. 8ept. SO. 1981.
unless otherwise noted.
1447.250 Basis and purpose.
Ca) This subpart implements section
1902(s)(13)(A) of the Act. which requires that the State plan provide for
payment for hospital and long-term
care facility services through the use
of rates that the. State finds, and
makes assurances satisfactory to the
Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs that must be
incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities to provide
services in conformity with State and
Federal laws, regulations, and quality
and safety standards.
<b) Section 447.253(a)(2) implements
section 1902(a)(30) of the Act. which
requires that payments be consistent
with efficiency, economy, and quaJjty
of care;
(c) Section 447.271 implements section 1903(JK3) of the Act. which requires that payments for inpatient
hospital services not exceed the hospital's customary charges.
Cd) Section 447.280 implements section 1913(b) of the Act. which concerns reimbursement for long-term
care services furnished by swing-bed
hospitals.
C4S FR 58057. Dec. 19.19831

-2-

i447Jt$3

(Hliir requirement*.

(a) State assurances. In order to receive HCFA approval of a significant State plan change in payment methods and standards, the Medicaid
agency must make assurances satisfactory to HCFA that the requirements
aet forth in paragraphs (b) through
<g) of this section are being met, must
submit the related information required by 1447.255 of this subpart,
and must comply with all other requirements of this subpart.
<b) Findings. Whenever the Medicaid agency makes a significant change
in its methods and standards, but not
less often than annually, the agency
must make the following findings
(1) Payment rales, (i) The Medicaid
agency pays for inpatient hospital
services and long-term care facility
services through the use of rates that
are reasonable and adequate to meet
the costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
providers «io provide services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and
safety standards.
(ii) With respect to inpatient hospital services—
(A) The methods and standards used
to determine payment rates take into
account the situation of hospitals
which serve a disproportionate
number of low income patients with
special needs.
(B) The methods and standards used
to determine payment rates provide
that reimbursement for hospital patients receiving services at an inappropriate level of care under conditions
similar to those described in section
M6HVX1XG) of the Act will be made
at lower rates, reflecting the level of
care actually received, in a manner
consistent with section 1S61(VK1KC);
and
<C) The payment rates are adequate
to assure that recipients have reasonable access, taking into account geographic location and reasonable travel
time, to inpatient hospital services of
adequate quality.
(2) Upper.limits. The Medicaid agency's estimated average proposed payment rate is reasonably expected to
pay no more in the aggregate for inpatient hospital services or long-term
care facility services than the amount
that the agency reasonably estimates
would be paid for the services under
the Medicare principles of reimbursement.

I4IFH479"] Sfl i H
Hov. 4. 1981]
§447.252

196i U Fh MU3

SUtU plftn requirements.

<a) The plan must provide that the
requirements of this subpart are met.
(b) The plan must specify comprehensively the methods and standards
used by the agency to set payment
rates in a manner consistent with 45
CFR 201.2.
(c) If the agency chooses to apply
the cost limits established under Medicare (see 1405.460 of this chapter) on
an individual provider basis, the plan
must specify this requirement
(Approved by the Office of Management
and Budget under control number 09360193)
(48 FR 54058. Dec. 19. 19831
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